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Abstract
We consider the practical and classical setting where the seller is using an ex-
ploration stage to learn the value distributions of the bidders before running a
revenue-maximizing auction in a exploitation phase. In this two-stage process,
we exhibit practical, simple and robust strategies with large utility uplifts for the
bidders. We quantify precisely the seller revenue against non-discounted buyers,
complementing recent studies that had focused on impatient/heavily discounted
buyers. We also prove the robustness of these shading strategies to sample approxi-
mation error of the seller, to bidder’s approximation error of the competition and to
possible change of the mechanisms.
Introduction
Repeated auctions play an important role in modern economics as they are widely used in practice
to sell e.g. electrical power or digital goods such as ad placements on big online platforms. Under-
standing the precise interactions between the buyers and the sellers in these auctions is key to assess
the balance of power on big online platforms. In practice, most of the online auctioneers are using
tools at the intersection of classical auction literature [1] and statistical learning theory. They take
advantage of the enormous amount of data they gather on the behavior of the buyers to learn optimal
auctions and maximize revenue for the platforms.
Myerson showed how to design an incentive-compatible revenue-maximizing auction once the
seller knows the value distributions of the buyers [1]. If the seller has perfect knowledge of these
distributions, she can define the allocation and payment rules maximizing her expected revenue.
How does the seller learn these value distributions in practice to create her optimal revenue-
maximizing auction ? A very rich line of work [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] has assumed that the seller has access
to a finite sample of bidders’ valuations, coming from past bids in truthful auctions. The game they
consider is divided in two stages. The first round consists in several truthful auctions such as a second
price auction without reserve or with random reserve where the bidders bid truthfully providing the
seller with draws from their value distribution. Then, if the bidders are not strategic in the first stage,
the seller can learn an approximation of the revenue-maximizing auction based on these samples and
run a revenue-maximizing auction in the second stage.
A first way to prevent the bidders from being strategic is to adapt the mechanism (e.g. the reserve price
shown) based on the competition of a bidder rather than based on the bidder themselves [8, 9, 10]. A
limitation of this type of approach is the need to rely on (partial) symmetry of the bidders: any bidder
is assumed to have some competitors with (almost) the same value distribution as them. In particular
and as noticed in [10], it cannot handle the existence of any dominant buyer, i.e., a buyer with higher
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values than the other bidders. This is therefore a somewhat limited setting as revenue-optimizing
mechanisms are especially needed when buyers are heterogenous.
On big online platforms, the same dominant bidders are actually repeatedly interacting with a seller,
billions of times a day in the case of online advertising. This setting has been considered from either
the seller’s point of view in [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] or the bidders’ standpoint [9, 16, 17, 18]. All these
works can be seen as a special instance of a Stackelberg game [19] where the bidders know the rules
of the mechanism and have the choice of the bid distribution they will disclose to the seller. The
main takeaway from these works is that if one of the seller or bidders is extremely dominant in term
of patience – i.e. longer time horizon of revenue optimization – then this player can get the best
revenue/utility to hope for: the payment of a revenue-maximizing auction if the seller is strongly
dominant, the utility of a 2nd-price auction with no reserve price if the bidders are strongly dominant
and are all strategic. Yet, these payments have been exhibited in extreme asymptotic cases. In the
line of work following from [11, 14], the bidder is assumed to be finitely patient while the seller is
infinitely patient. In this strongly unbalanced setting, the seller is able to begin with exploration stages
long enough to force the bidder to be truthful, allowing the seller to play the revenue-maximizing
auction in the (longer) exploitation phase. On the contrary, if the bidders are infinitely patient and the
seller has to update the mechanism in finite time, [16, 17] exhibited optimal strategies that bidders
can enforce. The remaining crucial question is: what happens in between these extreme cases, in
more realistic conditions?
Our work aims at providing answers to this question by studying the robustness of the bidders’
strategic behavior to more realistic conditions:
1. Are these strategic behaviors robust to strategic sellers implementing two-stage process
(exploration/exploitation) such as the ones described in [11, 15]? How is the value shared
between seller and bidders in non-asymptotic “patience" conditions?
2. Are the possible strategic behaviors robust to the seller optimizing the mechanism with a
finite number of samples?
3. How does the lack of knowledge of the competition (i.e. other bidders’s value distributions)
negatively impact the strategic bidder’s utility?
1 Framework and contributions
As it is classical in auction theory [20], we assume the valuation of a bidder v ∈ R is drawn from
a specific distribution F (the distribution can be different from one bidder to the other); a bidding
strategy is a mapping β from R+ into R+ that provides the actual bid B = β(v) when the value
is v. As a consequence, the distribution of bids FB is the push-forward of F by β. We assume
from now on that the support of F is [0, b) ⊆ [0,+∞]. If b = +∞, we additionally assume that
F verifies 1 − F (x) = o(x−1) to avoid problems with the definition of the optimal reserve price.
Unless otherwise noted F is assumed to be regular.
The seller has an estimate of the bidders’ bid distribution, typically coming from access to past bids.
Then, she uses an approximation of a revenue-maximizing auction based on her estimate of the
bid distributions. We will consider that this is a lazy 2nd-price auction [21] whose reserve price is
optimized to maximize the seller’s revenue. For the lazy 2nd-price auction, the optimal reserve price
happens to be the monopoly price r∗β which maximizes the monopoly revenue
RB(r) = r(1− FB(r))
extracted by the seller on the current bidder. We can formalize this as a two-step process [11, 3]:
General two-step process with commitment: A general two-step process with commitment is a
tuple of the form P = (G,H, r, F ) that is defined as follows:
1 – exploration The seller runs a lazy 2nd-price auction. The current bidder faces a competition
G. In this step, the potential randomized or deterministic reserve price is denoted by the
distribution H .
2 – exploitation The seller runs a lazy 2nd-price auction with reserve price r, possibly personalized.
The current bidder faces the same competition G as in the first step.
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To make explicit the dependency on the bidder’s strategy β on the design of the auction of the second
step when optimizing the reserve price based on the observation of the first period, we use the notation
P β = (G,H, r∗β , F ). The tradeoff between exploration and exploitation from the seller standpoint
was introduced in [11] and refined in [14, 15]. They introduce a parameter α, 0 ≤ α < 1, to define
this trade-off, assuming the ratio of length between the first and the second stage is equal to α/1− α.
[11] proved that if bidders are non-discounted buyers, there must exist a good strategy for them in this
mechanism, forcing the seller to suffer a regret linear in the number of auctions. We are interested
in solving the Stackelberg game faced by bidders when they know the seller is using this classical
mechanism to learn their value distribution. Bidders are the leaders in this framework since they
know the mechanism used by the seller and can choose their strategy accordingly.
We assume that the strategic bidder commits to the same strategy β (inducing the same distribution
of bids FB) in both phases. This assumption accounts for the fact that in practice sellers regularly
update their priors based on recent past bids, forcing the bidders to commit in the long-term to the bid
distribution they want the seller to use as prior. Otherwise, the seller might discover new aspects of
the buyer’s bid distribution and change their mechanism accordingly more than once as time evolves.
In this framework, the objective of the bidder is to choose a strategy β to maximize a weighted sum
of her utility in both phases:
Uα(β) = αU1(β) + (1− α)U2(β) (1)
where Ui is the expected utility of the bidder in stage i. The α ∈ [0, 1] quantifies the length of each
stage [11]. More precisely, U1 is the expected utility of a lazy second price without reserve/with
random reserve and U2 is the expected utility of a lazy second price with monopoly reserves
corresponding to FB .
[16, 17] exhibited strategies for the case where the bidders only optimize for the utility of the second
phase, i.e. α = 0. However, in practice, sellers use an exploration stage to learn the value distribution.
Taking care of this exploration phase is of great importance for the bidders since optimizing only the
second stage can lead to large loss of utility during the first stage.
In Section 2, we extend the approach of [16, 17] to the two-stage game showing that the strategies
which are optimal when the bidder is only optimizing her utility in the second stage are suboptimal
when she takes into consideration the exploration stage of the seller. We find in Section 3 the optimal
strategy in this framework and study the behavior of this strategy as a function of the length of the
exploration stage. To study whether the strategies are robust to the presence of other strategic bidders
in the game, we also prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium under certain conditions and we
compute the utility of the bidders and the revenue of the seller at this Nash equilibrium when it exists.
Unlike [11, 15], we consider the objective function of the bidders to be the expected utility of the two
stages instead of the utility computed on a finite number of auctions. Indeed, as there exists a high
number of repeated auctions, billions a day in the case of online advertising, optimizing directly the
expected utility makes sense from a bidder’s standpoint. We extend our results to finite sample sizes
in Section 4.1. We finally show the strategies are robust to an estimation of the bidders’ competition
in Section 4.2 and to a change of mechanism in Section 4.3. It shows their robustness to most of the
difficulties bidders practically face and provides concrete solutions to solve these problems.
2 Understanding the strategic reaction of the players
In order to get a good understanding of how the welfare is shared between seller and bidders when α
moves from 0 to 1, we need to study the strategies of the different players. First, on the seller’s side,
she chooses the distribution of reserve prices H faced by the strategic bidder in the first phase. At
this point, we assume the seller does not have any knowledge about the bidders (except the support
of the value distribution). Hence, she mostly has two choices for H: either no reserve price or a
uniform distribution [12]. In the second stage, the seller is assumed welfare-benevolent, i.e. if she
has the choice between two reserve prices equivalent in terms of payment, she chooses the lowest
one. Hence, in the second stage, the seller chooses r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r).
From a bidder’s standpoint, [16, Th. 6.2] exhibits the best response for the extreme case α = 0.
Unfortunately, this best response induces a complicated optimization problem for the seller: RB is
non-convex with several local optima and the global optimum is reached at a discontinuity of RB (see
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Figure 1: Left: illustration of strategies. Right: function optimized by the seller b(1 − FB(b))
depending on the strategy for values distribution F being U(0, 1). R is set at 0.2, x1 is set such that
x1(1− F (x1)) = R (right root) and x0 ' 0.27 for β˜x0,x1 .
Fig. 1). This is especially problematic if sellers are known to optimize reserve prices conditionally
on some available context using parametric models such as Deep Neural Networks [22] whose fit is
optimized via first-order optimization and hence would regularly fail to find the global optimum. This
is undesirable for the bidders: in any Stackelberg game, the leader’s advantage comes from being
able to predict the follower’s strategy.
To address this issue, [16, 17] proposed a thresholding strategy that is the best response in the
restricted class of strategies that ensure RB to be concave as long as RX is so, when α = 0. We show
this strategy can be extended to the two-stage process with a slight modification. The requirement is
to ensure RBi to be quasi-concave as long as RX is so. Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Given a two-step process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r) and such that F
is quasi-regular1, ∀α ∈ [0, 1], ∃0 ≤ x0 ≤ x1 such that the best quasi-regular response (maximizing
Uα(β) with FB regular) is
β˜x0,x1(x) = 1[x≤x0]x+ 1[x0<x≤x1]
R
1− F (x) + 1[x>x1]x where R = x1(1− F (x1)) (2)
Moreover, we have x1 = sup{x : x(1− F (x)) ≥ R} and x0 ≤ x0 = inf{x : x(1− F (x)) ≥ R}.
The proof is in Appendix B.2.
Remark. The thresholding strategy from [16, 17] is a special case of β˜x0,x1 in the case when x0 = 0
and we will denote it β˜x1 for simplicity. As we will see in Section 3.1, when α is small enough (but
not 0 yet), x0 = 0 is optimal. It thus makes sense to study both these strategies.
This class of strategies solves the main drawback of the best response from [16]. If the value
distribution Fi is quasi-regular, then the bid distribution FB is also quasi-regular, offering a quasi-
concave maximization problem (thus “predictable" for the buyer) to the seller. Figure 1 illustrates
the different strategies as well as the corresponding optimization problems and the virtual values
associated to the push-forward bid distributions. Understanding the strategic answer of the bidders
helps avoiding worst-case scenario reasoning when studying the revenue of the sellers against strategic
bidders. We now quantify precisely how the welfare is shared between strategic bidders and seller.
3 Welfare sharing between seller and buyers
This section presents how the welfare is shared in the two-stage process with strategic bidders. First,
we show how to numerically compute the best response and illustrate the variation of utility and
payment with α. After remarking and showing that the thresholded strategy [17] is optimal for greater
values of α than 0, we focus on this strategy and show the existence of a Nash equilibrium. It proves
that even in the case of multiple strategic bidders, there exists strategies that enable bidders to take
advantage of the learning stage of the seller.
1We say a distribution is quasi-regular if the associated revenue curve RXi is quasi-concave
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Figure 2: Welfare sharing with random reserve in stage 1: Left – Utility of strategic bidder in the
two-stage game as a function of α. Middle – Payment of strategic bidder in the two-stage game as a
function of α. The dotted lines corresponds to phase 1, the dashed ones to phase 2 and the plain line
for the full game. The blue color is used for the bidder’s utility and the red for her payment. The
black color is used for the baseline of truthful bidding. Right: evolution of x∗0, x
∗
1 with α.
3.1 Welfare sharing with best quasi-regular response
We first show how to obtain numerically the best response β˜x0,x1 by solving the maximization
problem of Uα restricted to the class of strategies described in Th. 1. This allows us to show how the
bidder’s utility and payment vary with α.
Theorem 2. Given a two-stage process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r), the best
response is of the form of β˜x∗0 ,x∗1 and the utility Uα(β˜x0,x1) has the following derivatives:
∂Uα(β˜x0,x1)
∂x0
=α(1− F (x0))G(x0)H(x0)− x0f(x0)Gα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
(1− F (x0))
)
(3)
∂Uα(β˜x0,x1)
∂x1
=f(x1)ψ(x1)
(
Gα(x1)− EX
(
1[x0≤X≤x1]
X
(1− F (X))gα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
(1− F (X))
)))
(4)
where Gα(x) = αG(x)H(x) + (1− α)G(x) and ψ(x) = x− 1−F (x)f(x) .
The proof is in Appendix B.3. We now use these results to compute numerically the best response in
the following two-stage process: P1 = (G=U[0,1], H=0, r∗β˜x∗0 ,x∗1
, F =U[0,1]) (uniformly distributed
reserve in stage 1)
The results are presented in Fig. 3. First, we recover the results from the literature corresponding to
the extremes values of α. For α = 1−, the payment and utility in the second stage are the ones of a
2nd-price with monopoly price of value distribution. As α decreases, the total payment over the two
stages quickly decreases (and utility increases) towards values that are even more favorable to the
bidder than the ones of a 2nd-price with no reserve price. This is consistent with the observations from
[17] (case α = 0): if only one bidder is strategic, the payment of this strategic bidder can decrease
even further than the one of a 2nd-price with no reserve price. In Appendix B.4, we provide the same
study with random reserve and show that the presence of exploration of the reserve prices in the first
period (difference between left and right) does not impact much the payment/utility of the second
period. It slightly decreases the advantage of the bidder, but not significantly.
Finally, we observe two regimes for x∗0 (Fig. 3, right): for α < 0.8 it is 0 and for α > 0.8 it is the
value that saturates the inequality constraint described by Th. 1 between x0 and x1. This illustrates
why we cannot only use first-order optimality condition: the optimal value is often reached on the
edge of the feasible domain. We formalize this latter observation and shows that when α is small
enough, the reserve value x∗0 is exactly 0.
Lemma 1. Given a two-step process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r). If ∃y ∈
[0, b],∀x < y, G(x)H(x)f(x) < x and G(x)H(x)f(x) is bounded on [0, x∗] with x∗ = inf argmaxxRX(x),
then ∃α0 > 0 such that ∀α < α0,
(x∗0, x
∗
1) ∈ argmax
x0,x1
Uα(β˜x0,x1) ⇒ x∗0 = 0
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The proof can be found in Appendix B.3. G(x)H(x)f(x) being bounded on [0, x
∗] is satisfied if F is MHR
(monotonous hazard rate). G(x)H(x)f(x) < x is the key assumption. Intuitively, it can be interpreted as "if
the bidder has enough mass under the competition, she can overbid at almost no cost on small values
to decrease the reserve value to 0." This theorem shows that the thresholding strategies proposed in
[16, 17] are actually optimal for α small enough and not just for α = 0. In the following subsections,
we carry out a formal analysis for such strategies β˜0,x1 = β˜x1 as we can more easily characterize the
best response and prove Nash equilibria.
3.2 Phase transition for the classical thresholding strategies in the two-stage game
We suppose in this subsection that the seller commits to thresholding, i.e. x0 = 0 with the notation
above. The seller uses monopoly reserves in the second phase.
Theorem 3. We call Gα = αG1 + (1− α)G2, G1 and G2 being the distributions of the competition
faced by the bidder in the two phases, possibly including reserve prices. We assume ψ−1(0) > 0. If
the buyer uses the thresholding strategy β˜x1 of Theorem 1 and commits to it, we have for their utility,
if the seller is welfare benevolent : the utility has (in general) a discontinuity at x1 = ψ−1(0). For
x1 < ψ
−1(0), we have U(0) ≥ U(x1). For x1 > ψ−1(0), the first order condition are the same as
in [17, 16] where the distribution of the competition is now Gα = αG1 + (1 − α)G2. Call x∗1(α)
the unique solution of this problem. Hence, the optimal threshold is argmaxx1∈{0,x∗1(α)} U(x1). An
optimal threshold at x1 = 0 corresponds to bidding truthfully.
Lemma 2 (Phase transition in α). Assume the setup of Theorem 3. Suppose that G1 = G2, i.e. the
distribution of the competition is the same in the two phases and there is no reserve price in the
first phase. Then there is a critical value αc for which, if α < αc, it is preferable for the bidder to
threshold and if α > αc, it is preferable for the bidder to bid truthfully.
The proofs of the theorem and the lemma can be found in Section D and we provide more details on
the utility there. A graphical illustration of these results can be found in the Appendix, Figure 4.
3.3 Existence of a Nash equilibrium in the two-stage game
Most of the literature on strategic buyers in repeated auctions have focused on the posted price setting
[11, 4], though see [15] for a recent extension to second price auction. To complement this line of
work, we exhibit now the existence of a Nash equilibrium between strategic bidders in the two-stage
game. Our approach here is the following. All players have essentially two strategies, according
to Theorem 3: they can either threshold optimally above the monopoly price or bid truthfully. We
consider the first order conditions for a Nash equilibrium if all players threshold and we then study
the best response of the remaining player.
Theorem 4. We consider the symmetric case where all bidders have the same value distribution F
and it is regular. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1]. Suppose this
distribution has density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f(1) 6= 0 and ψ crosses 0 exactly once and
hence is positive beyond that crossing point.
In the case where α = 0, there is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium. The revenue of the bidders
in this case is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve.
For any fixed α > 0, there exists αc,thresh (possibly 0 or∞) such that if α ≤ αc,tresh there exists a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in the class of thresholded strategies. It is the same as in the case α = 0
and hence the revenue of the bidders is again the same as in a second price auction with no reserve.
There exists αc,truthful (possibly 0 or ∞) such that if α ≥ αc,truthful there exists a symmetric Nash
equilibrium in the class of thresholded strategies and it corresponds to bidding truthfully.
The proof for the case α = 0 is in Section C. The remainder of the proof is in Section D. The presence
of other strategic bidders does not prevent bidders from taking advantage of the learning stage of the
seller.
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4 Robustness of bidding strategies to the information structure of the game
We study the robustness of the bidding strategies to several variants of the two-stage game: 1) the
seller is using an approximation of the bid distribution to compute the reserve price of the second
stage, 2) the bidder does not have an estimation of the competition to compute the optimal strategy
for the two-stage game and 3) the seller replaces the lazy second price with monopoly reserve with
another type of auction. Their simplicity and robustness make them relevant in real-world interactions.
4.1 Robustness to sample approximation of the seller and ERM/optimization algorithms
In practice, the seller needs to estimate the distribution of the buyer and hence does not have a perfect
knowledge of the bid distribution FBi . The buyer needs to find a robust shading method, making sure
that the seller has an incentive to lower her reserve price, even if she misestimates the bid distribution.
We focus on the specific problem of empirical risk minimization (ERM)[5, 6, 7]. In Appendix E.2,
we give some results about the impact of empirically estimating the value distribution F by the
empirical cumulative distribution function Fˆn on setting the reserve price. However because our
approximations are formulated in terms of hazard rate, applying those results would yield quite poor
approximation results in the context of setting the monopoly price through ERM. This is due to
the fact that estimating a density pointwise in supremum norm is a somewhat difficult problem in
general, associated with poor rates of convergence [23]. We now show how to take advantage of the
characteristics of ERM to obtain better results than would have been possible by only considering the
approximation error made on the virtual value.
Theorem 5. Suppose the buyer has a continuous and increasing value distribution F , supported
on [0, b], b ≤ ∞, with the property that if r ≥ y ≥ x, F (y) − F (x) ≥ γF (y − x), where γF > 0.
Suppose that supt≥r t(1−F (t)) = r(1−F (r)). Suppose the buyer uses the strategy β˜()r defined as
β˜()r (x) =
(
(r − )(1− F (r))
1− F (x) + 
)
1[x≤r] + x1[x>r] ,
Assume she samples n values {xi}ni=1 i.i.d according to the distribution F and bids accordingly in
second price auctions. Call x(n) = max1≤i≤n xi. In this case the (population) reserve value x∗
is equal to 0. Assume that the seller uses empirical risk minimization to determine the monopoly
price in a (lazy) second price auction, using these n samples. Call xˆ∗n the reserve value determined
by the seller using ERM. We have, if Cn(δ) = n−1/2
√
log(2/δ)/2 and  > x(n)Cn(δ)/F (r) with
probability at least 1− δ1,
xˆ∗n <
2rCn(δ)
γF
with probability at least 1− (δ + δ1) .
In particular, if  is replaced by a sequence n such that n1/2nmin(1, 1/x(n))→∞ in probability,
xˆ∗n goes to 0 in probability like n
−1/2max(1, x(n))/n.
Informally speaking, our theorem says that using the strategy β˜(n)r with n slightly larger than n−1/2
will yield a reserve value arbitrarily close to 0. Hence the population results we derived in earlier
sections apply to the sample version of the problem. We give examples and discuss our assumptions
in Appendix E.2 where we prove the theorem.
4.2 Robustness to the knowledge of the competition distribution
Another common situation is that bidders do not know in advance the competition G they are facing.
They need to estimate it from past interactions with the seller and other bidders. First, we show that
there exists some strategies that do not need a precise estimation of the competition. Then, we look at
some worst-case scenario where the goal is to find the strategy with the highest utility in the worst
case of G. We are optimizing the bidding strategy in the class of thresholded strategies.
Theorem 6 (Thresholding at the monopoly price). Consider the one-strategic setting in a lazy second
price auction with FXi the value distribution of the strategic bidder i with a seller computing the
reserve prices to maximize her revenue. Consider βtr the truthful strategy. Consider the case of
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α = 1. Then there exists β which does not depend on G and : 1) Ui(β) ≥ Ui(βtr), Ui being the
utility of the strategic bidder. 2) Ri(β) ≥ Ri(βtr), Ri being the payment of bidder i to the seller.
Then, β˜()ψ−1(0) fulfill these conditions for  ≥ 0 small enough.
For  = 0, we call this strategy the thresholded strategy at the monopoly price. In the two-stage game,
there is a critical value αc for which, if α < αc, it is preferable for the bidder to threshold at the
monopoly price and if α > αc, it is preferable for the bidder to bid truthfully.
The formal proof in the general case is in Appendix F. The nice and crucial property of thresholding
at the monopoly price is that it does not depend on a specific knowledge of the competition.
Numerical applications in the case α = 0: In the case of two bidders with uniform value distri-
bution, the strategic bidder utility increases from 0.083 to 0.132, (a 57% increase). In the case of two
bidders with exponential distribution,with parameters µ = 0.25 and σ = 1, the utility of the strategic
bidders goes from 0.791 to 1.025 (a 29.5% increase). This theorem shows that even if a fine-tuned
knowledge of the competition helps bidders increase their utility, there exists a strategy where bidders
do not need to know the competition and can still significantly increase their utility. Due to lack of
space, we provide more results on the impact of knowledge of the competition in Appendix F.
4.3 Robustness to a change of mechanism
We finally show that the thresholded strategies are robust to certain changes of mechanism. This
makes sense in the framework of Stackelberg games with no commitment where the player performs
a certain optimization given the objective function of the other player whereas this other player can
decide to change her optimization problem. In this section, we study the impact on the utility of
the second stage if the seller decides to change from a lazy second price with monopoly reserve to
another type of revenue-maximizing auction.
Myerson auction. In the one-strategic setting, in the symmetric case where all bidders have initially
the same value distribution, we show that the utility gain for the strategic bidder of thresholding at
the monopoly price is higher in the Myerson auction than in the lazy second price auction.
Lemma 3. Consider the case where the distribution of the competition is fixed. Assume all bidders
have the same value distribution FX , and that FX is regular. Assume that bidder i is strategic
and that the K − 1 other bidders bid truthfully. Let us denote by βtruth the truthful strategy and
βthresh the thresholded strategy at the monopoly price. The utility of bidder i in the Myerson auction
UMyersoni and in the lazy second price auction U
Lazy
i satisfy
UMyersoni (βthresh)− UMyersoni (βtruth) ≥ ULazyi (βthresh)− ULazyi (βtruth).
The proof is given in Appendix G.1. Numerics with K = 2 bidders with U [0, 1] value distribution:
The utility is 1/12 in the truthful case in both lazy second price and Myerson since these auctions are
identical in the symmetric case. The utility of the thresholded strategy at monopoly price is 7/48 in
the Myerson auction, i.e. 75% more than the utility with the truthful strategy. We note that the gain is
larger than for a second price auction with monopoly reserve where the extra utility was 57%.
Eager second price auction with monopoly price. Monopoly reserves are not optimal reserve
prices for this version of the second price auction in general but in practice, the optimal ones are
NP-hard to compute [24, 21]. We recall that the eager second price auction is a standard second price
auction between bidders who clear their reserves.
Lemma 4. Consider the same setting and notations as Lemma 3. The utility of bidder i in the eager
second price auction with monopoly reserves, UEageri , and in the lazy second price auction U
Lazy
i
with the same reserves, satisfy : UEageri (βthresh)− UEageri (βtruth) ≥ ULazyi (βthresh)− ULazyi (βtruth).
The proof is given in Appendix G.2. These two lemmas show that thresholded strategies can increase
the utility of strategic bidders even if the seller runs a different auction in the different stage than the
lazy second price auction with monopoly price. In future work, we plan to design games between
bidders and seller where the seller can change the mechanism at any point and bidders can update
their bidding strategy changing the bid distribution observed by the seller.
8
5 Conclusion
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on learning in the presence of strategic behavior. It
extends recent work on repeated auctions [12, 14] and addresses a key issue recognized in these
papers, namely understanding the interaction between sellers and multiple strategic buyers. We
propose novel optimal strategies for the canonical problem of auction design with unknown value
distributions that are learned in an exploration phase and exploited thereafter. The Stackelberg game
we consider exhibit complex solutions but we provide simple strategies that can be made robust to
various setups reflecting how much information bidders have about the game they are participating
in. This allows buyers to quantify the price of revealing information about their values in repeated
auctions. It also opens new avenues for research on the seller side by providing new realistic strategies
that may adopted by the strategic bidder.
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A Proof of Myerson Lemma
Lemma 1 (Integrated version of the Myerson lemma). Let bidder i have value distribution Fi and
call βi her strategy, FBi the induced distribution of bids and ψBi the corresponding virtual value
function. Assume that FBi has a density and finite mean. Suppose that i’s bids are independent of
the bids of the other bidders and denote by Gi the cdf of the maximum of their bids. Suppose a lazy
second price auction with reserve price denoted by r is run. Then the payment Mi of bidder i to the
seller can be expressed as
M(βi) = EBi∼FBi
(
ψBi(Bi)Gi(Bi)1(Bi ≥ r)
)
.
When the other bidders are bidding truthfully, Gi is the distribution of the maximum value of the
other bidders.
Proof. The proof is similar to the original one [1] (see [20] for more details). It consists in using
Fubini’s theorem and integration by parts (this is why we need conditions on FBi) to transform the
standard form of the seller revenue, i.e.
EBi∼FBi ,Bj∼FBj
(
max
j 6=i
(Bj , r)1[Bi≥maxj 6=i(Bj ,r)]
)
into the above equation. We consider a lazy second price auction. Call r the reserve price for bidder i.
So the seller revenue from bidder i is
E
(
max
j 6=i
(Bj , r)1[Bi≥maxj 6=i(Bj ,r)]
)
In general, we could just call Yi = maxj 6=iBj and say that the revenue from i, or i’th expected
payment is
E
(
max(Yi, r)1[Bi≥max(Yi,r)]
)
.
Call G the cdf of Yi and G˜ the cdf of max(Yi, r). Note that G˜(t) = 1[t≥r]G(t).
So if we note Bi = t, we have
E
(
max(Yi, r)1[Bi≥max(Yi,r)]|Bi = t
)
=
∫ t
0
udG˜(u)
Integrating by parts we get∫ t
0
udG˜(u) = uG˜(u)
∣∣∣t
0
−
∫ t
0
G˜(u)du
= tG˜(t)−
∫ t
0
G˜(u)du = 1[t≥r]
[
tG(t)−
∫ t
r
G(u)du
]
Hence,
E
(
max(Yi, r)1[bi≥max(Yi,r)]
)
=
∫ ∞
0
[
1[bi≥r]biG(bi)−
∫ bi
0
1[u≥r]G(u)du
]
fBi(bi)dbi
The first term of this integral is simply∫ ∞
0
1[bi≥r]biG(bi)fBi(bi)dbi = E
(
BiG(Bi)1[Bi≥r]
)
.
Note that to split the two terms of the integral we need to assume that E (Bi) <∞, hence the first
moment assumption on Fi. The other part of the integral is∫ ∞
0
(∫ bi
0
1[u≥r]G(u)du
)
fBi(bi)dbi =
∫ ∞
0
(∫
1[bi≥u]1[u≥r]G(u)du
)
fBi(bi)dbi (5)
=
∫ ∫
1[u≥r]G(u)1[bi≥u]fBi(bi)dbidu =
∫
1[u≥r]G(u)
(∫
1[bi≥u]f(bi)dbi
)
du (6)
=
∫
1[u≥r]G(u)P (Bi ≥ u)du =
∫
1[u≥r]G(u)
1− FBi(u)
fBi(u)
fBi(u)du (7)
= E
(
1[Bi≥r]G(Bi)
1− FBi(Bi)
fBi(Bi)
)
(8)
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We used Fubini’s theorem to change order of integrations, since all functions are non-negative. The
result follows.
Of course, when fBi(bi) = 0 somewhere we understand fBi(bi)/fBi(bi) = 0/0 as being equal to 1.
To avoid this problem completely we can also simply write
M(βi) =
∫
[bifBi(bi)− (1− FBi(bi))]G(bi)1[bi≥r]dbi =
∫
∂[bi(FBi(bi)− 1)]
∂bi
G(bi)1[bi≥x]dbi .
If FBi is not differentiable but absolutely continuous, its Radon-Nikodym derivative is used when
interpreting the differentiation of [bi(FBi(bi)− 1)] with respect to bi.
A.1 Technical lemmas
Lemma 5. Suppose Bi = βi(Xi), where βi is increasing and differentiable and Xi is a random
variable with cdf Fi and pdf fi. Then
hβi(xi) , βi(x)− β′i(x)
1− Fi(x)
fi(x)
= ψFBi (βi(x)) . (9)
Proof. ψFBi (b) = b−
1−FBi (b)
fBi (b)
with FBi(b) = Fi(β
−1
i (b)) and fBi(b) = fi(β
−1
i (b)/β
′
i(β
−1
i (b).
Then, hβi(x) = ψBi(βi(x)) = βi(x)− β′i(x) 1−Fi(x)fi(x) .
The second lemma shows that for any function g we can find a function β such that hβ = g.
Lemma 6. Let X be a random variable with cdf F and pdf f . Assume that f > 0 on the support of
X . Let x0 in the support of X , C ∈ R and g : R→ R. lf we note
βg(x) =
C(1− F (x0))−
∫ x
x0
g(u)f(u)du
1− F (x) . (10)
Then, if B = βg(X),
hβg (x) = g(x) and βg(x0) = C .
If x0 ≤ t and g is non-decreasing on [x0, t], β′g(x) ≥ (C − g(x))(1− F (x0))f(x)/(1− F (x)) for
x ∈ [x0, t]. Hence βg is increasing on [x0, t] if g is non-decreasing and g < C.
Proof. The result follows by simply differentiating the expression for βg, and plugging-in the
expression for hβg obtained in Lemma 5. The result on the derivative is simple algebra.
B Optimal Classes of Strategies for two-step Process
Disclaimer: Our lines of proof here are very similar to the one in [16], adapted to the two-stage
process. The main difference is that in the two-stage process, the optimal reserve value is not always
0, which gives slightly different forms of optimal strategies for the regular case and make us introduce
a quasi-regular case. Also, note that some of the proofs do not require assumptions as strong as we
do in the paper on the continuity of F.
General two-stage process with commitment: A general two-stage process with commitment is
a tuple of the form P = (G,H, r, F ) that is defined as follow:
1 – exploration The seller runs a lazy 2nd-price auction without reserve price. The current bidder
faces a competition G. In this step, the potential randomized or deterministic reserve price
is denoted by the distribution H .
2 – exploitation The seller runs a lazy 2nd-price auction with reserve price r. The current bidder
faces the same competition G as in the first step.
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The bidder has a value distributionF . In this process, the bidder commits to a strategy β corresponding
to a bid distribution FB that stays the same in both steps. We additionally assume that FB is also not
too fat-tailed – meaning 1− FB(b) = o(b−1) to ensure the seller’s revenue supremum is reached for
at least some finite values of reserve price.
The two-step process described in the main body of the paper corresponds to a such a tuple
Pβ = (G1, G2, r
∗
B , F ) where r is chosen to maximize RB(r), the revenue of the seller defined
as RB(r) = rPB∼FB (r ≤ B). We also assume the seller to be welfare-benevolent, meaning that
r∗β = min argmaxr RB(r).
Technical note on RB . If FB is not continuous, we need to make a difference between FB(b) =
PB∼FB (B ≤ b) and F˜B(b) = PB∼FB (B < b). Technically, FB is càdlàg as a repartition function,
while F˜B is làdcàg. More practically, if the distribution contains a point mass, the value at which
there is the point mass won’t be on the same side of the discontinuity in FB and in F˜B . In terms of
definition of the seller’s revenue RB , as beating the reserve price r is usually implemented as 1[B≥r],
then when doing the integration, we can indeed find the revenue is defined as RB(b) = b(1− F˜B(b)).
First, we state and (re-)prove a well-known property that is central for our proofs: that when the
reserve price does not depends on one bidder distribution, the closer her strategy to truthful, the better
in utility. For the sake of simplicity, we consider in this statement the reserve price is part of the fixed
competition.
Lemma 7. Given a two-stage process P = (G,H, r, F ), for any β, ρ and any α ∈ [0, 1],
∀x ∈ [0,+∞), ρ(x)(x− β(x)) ≤ 0 ⇒ Uα(β + ρ) ≤ Uα(β)
Proof. Denoting Gr is the cdf of Yr = max(Y, r) and Gα(x) = αG(x)H(x) + (1− α)Gr(x), we
have
Uα(β + ρ)− Uα(β) = αE X∼F
Y∼GH
[
(X − Y ) (1[β(X)+ρ(X)≥Y ] − 1[β(X)≥Y ])]
+ (1− α)E X∼F
Yr∼Gr
[
(X − Yr)
(
1[β(X)+ρ(X)≥Yr] − 1[β(X)≥Yr]
)]
= E X∼F
Y∼Gα
[
(X − Y ) (1[β(X)+ρ(X)≥Y >β(X)] − 1[β(X)≥Y >β(X)+ρ(X)])]
• if ∀x, β(x)+ρ(x) ≥ β(x) ≥ x then ∀x, (X−Y )1[β(X)+ρ(X)≥Y >β(X)] ≤ 0 (and the other
indicator is 0)
• if ∀x, β(x)+ρ(x) ≤ β(x) ≤ x then ∀x, (X−Y )1[β(X)≥Y >β(X)+ρ(X)] ≥ 0 (and the other
indicator is 0)
Both ways, ∀x, ρ(x)(x− β(x)) ≤ 0, then Uα(β + ρ)− Uα(β) ≤ 0.
B.1 Seller Revenue is Lower than with Truthful Bidding
If the reader is intuitively convinced that there exists a best response strategy β with B = β(X) such
that the monopoly revenue is not higher than the one of the truthful strategy – i.e. supr′ RB(r
′) ≤
supr′ RX(r
′) – you can safely skip this section. Only for this section, we are going to explicit the
dependency of the utility on the two-stage process P by using the notation UPα (β).
Lemma 8. Given a two-step process Pβ = (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r),
max
r
RB(r) > max
r
RX(r) ⇒ ∀α ∈ [0, 1], UPβα (β) < max
ω
UPωα (ω)
Proof. Assuming β is such that maxr RB(r) > R∗ = maxr RX(r), we can build ω such that for
any x such that β(x)(1− F˜ (x)) ≤ R∗, ω(x) = β(x) and ω(x) = R∗
1−F˜ (x) otherwise.
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We can choose ρ(x) = β(x)− ω(x) for any x. For any x, either we have x ≥ β(x) and ρ(x) ≥ 0 or
ρ(x) = 0. Hence, for any x, (x− β(x))ρ(x) ≥ 0. By Lemma 7, we have that in the process Pω (the
one with reserve price r∗ω in the second step), U
Pω
α (β) ≤ UPωα (ω).
Then, because r∗ω ≤ r∗β , we have UPβα (β) ≤ UPωα (β).
B.2 Deriving the Best Quasi-Regular Response
Because the revenue curve generated by the best response [16] has some limiting properties in
practice, we propose to further constrain β by asking RB to be quasi-concave when RX is so.
Theorem 1. Given a 2-step process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r) and such that F
is quasi-regular2, ∀α ∈ [0, 1], ∃0 ≤ x0 ≤ x1 such that the best quasi-regular response (maximizing
Uα(β) with FB regular) is
β˜x0,x1(x) = 1[x≤x0]x+ 1[x0<x≤x1]
R
1− F (x) + 1[x>x1]x where R = x1(1− F (x1)) (11)
Moreover, we have x1 = sup{x : x(1− F (x)) ≥ R} and x0 ≤ x0 = inf{x : x(1− F (x)) ≥ R}.
Proof. Thanks to Lemma 8 and to the Assumption that we have 1−FB(b) = o(b−1), we can restrict
ourselves w.l.o.g. to β with a finite reserve price r∗β . As RB is làdcàg and upper semicontinuous
(because F˜B is so), then ∃xr, r∗β = β(xr).
We denote R = supx(x ∧ β(x))(1− F˜ (x)) an define
ω(x) =

R
1−F˜ (x) if β(x)(1− F˜ (x)) ≤ R ≤ x(1− F˜ (x))
R
1−F˜ (x) if β(x)(1− F˜ (x)) ≥ R ≥ x(1− F˜ (x))
x otherwise
By definition of ω, denoting ρ(x) = β(x) − ω(x), we have that for any x, ρ(x)(x − ω(x)) ≤ 0.
Thus, by Lemma 7, U (Pβ)α (ω) ≤ U (Pβ)α (β).
Moreover, ω(xr)(1− F˜ (xr)) = R, thus r∗ω ≤ r∗β and U (Pω)α (ω) ≤ U (Pβ)α (ω). In the end, we have
U
(Pω)
α (ω) ≤ U (Pβ)α (β).
We can use Lemma 9 to show that {x : ω(x) = R
1−F˜ (x)} is convex and the decrease rate of the right
tail to say it is bounded, hence ∃x1 ≥ x0 ≥ 0, {x : ω(x) = R1−F˜ (x)} = [x0, x1].
Finally, we need to check the conditions on x0 and x1. By definition of R and x0, we have
x0 ≤ inf{x : x(1 − F˜ (x)) ≥ R}. Then, if x1 > sup{x : x(1 − F˜ (x)) ≥ R}, we can define
x˜1 = sup{x : x(1 − F˜ (x)) ≥ R}, then define ω˜ equal to ω below x˜1 and equal to the identity
above. Then we can use again Lemma 7 to show the utility is improved as the reserve price didn’t
change.
Lemma 9. Given two real-values functions f and g quasi-concave. we denote R = supx(f ∧ g)(x).
We have
{x : f(x) ≥ R} ∪ {x : g(x) ≥ R} is convex.
Proof. First, both {x : f(x) ≥ R} and {x : g(x) ≥ R} are convex (f, g are quasi-concave). By
contradiction, we assume there exists x < z < y such that f(x) ≥ R, g(y) ≥ R, f(z) < R and
g(z) < R. Because g is increasing before z, supx<z(f ∧ g)(x) ≤ g(z) < R. With the same
argument over f , we have supx>z(f ∧ g)(x) ≤ f(z) < R.
2We say a distribution is quasi-regular if the associated revenue curve RXi is quasi-concave
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B.3 Welfare Sharing between Seller and Bidder
Theorem 2. Given a two-step process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r), the best re-
sponse is of the form of β˜x∗0 ,x∗1 and the utility Uα(β˜x0,x1) has the following derivatives:
∂Uα(β˜x0,x1)
∂x0
=α(1− F (x0))G(x0)H(x0)− x0f(x0)Gα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
(1− F (x0))
)
(12)
∂Uα(β˜x0,x1)
∂x1
=f(x1)ψ(x1)
(
Gα(x1)− EX
(
1[x0≤X≤x1]
X
(1− F (X))gα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
(1− F (X))
)))
(13)
where Gα(x) = αG(x)H(x) + (1− α)G(x).
Proof. The push-forward of F through β˜x0,x1 has the following virtual value:
ψB(β(X)) = 1[X≤x0]ψ(X) + 1[x0<X≤x1]0 + 1[X>x1]ψ(X)
Then, we can use Myerson’s Lemma [1] to write the utility:
Uα(β˜x0,x1) = EX
(
1[X<x0](X − ψ(X))αG(x)H(x)
)
(14)
+ EX
(
1[x0<X≤x1]XGα
(
x1(1− F˜ (x1))
1− F˜ (x)
))
+ EX
(
1[X<x1](X − ψ(X))Gα(X)
)
Straigtforward calculations gives the derivatives.
Theorem 1. Given a two-step process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r). We assume
here ∀x ∈ (0, x∗], f(x) > 0 with x∗ = argmaxxRX(x). If ∃y ∈ (0, x∗],∀x < y, G(x)H(x)f(x) < x
and G(x)H(x)f(x) is bounded on (0, x
∗], then ∃α0 > 0 such that ∀α < α0,
(x∗0, x
∗
1) ∈ argmax
x0,x1
Uα(β˜x0,x1) ⇒ x∗0 = 0
Proof. Denoting x1 = supα x
∗
1,
∂Uα(β˜x0,x1)
∂x0
= α(1− F (x0))G(x0)H(x0)− x0f(x0)Gα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
(1− F (x0))
)
(15)
≤ αG(x0)H(x0)− x0f(x0)Gα (x1(1− F (x1))) (16)
≤ αG(x0)H(x0)− x0f(x0) inf
γ∈[0,1]
Gγ (x1(1− F (x1))) (17)
(18)
So ∂Uα(β˜x0,x1 )∂x0 ≤ 0 ⇔ α
G(x0)H(x0)
f(x0)
≤ x0 infγ∈[0,1]Gγ (x1(1− F (x1))). Finally,
as infγ∈[0,1]Gγ (x1(1− F (x1))) ∈ (0, b) (from Lemma 10), I can choose α0 =
1/ infγ∈[0,1]Gγ (x1(1− F (x1))).
Case x0 < y: from the assumptions, we can directly get ∂U(x0,x1)∂x0 ≤ 0.
Case y ≤ x0: Denoting C = supx∈[y,x∗] G(x)H(x)f(x) , we can denote α1 = yxα0 .
Finally, for α < α2 = min(α0, α1), we have
∂Uα(β˜x0,x1 )
∂x0
≤ 0 for any x0.
Lemma 10. Given a two-step process (G,H, r∗β , F ) with r∗β = inf argmaxr RB(r), we have x1 =
supα x
∗
1 < b.
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Proof. For this we study the different terms of Uα when x1 goes to b, to prove that in such case, the
utility goes to 0.
EX
(
1[X≤x∗0](X − ψX(X))αG(X)H(X)
)
≤
∫
1[X≤x∗0](1− F (X))G(X)H(X)αdX
≤
∫
1[X≤x∗0]dX
≤ x∗0 = ox∗1→b(1)
EX
(
1[X>x∗1](X − ψX(X))Gα(X)
)
≤
∫
1[X>x∗1](1− F (X))Gα(X)H(X)dX
≤
∫
1[X>x∗1](1− F (X))dX
= ox∗1→b(1) as either 1− F (x) = o(x−1) or b is finite.
Fix y ∈ (x∗0, x∗1),
EX
(
1[x∗0<X≤x∗1]XGα
(
x∗1(1− F (x∗1))
1− F (x)
))
= EX
(
1[x∗0<X≤y]XGα
(
x∗1(1− F (x∗1))
1− F (x)
))
+ EX
(
1[y<X≤x∗1]XGα
(
x∗1(1− F (x∗1))
1− F (x)
))
We have x∗1(1− F (x∗1))→ 0 when x∗1 → b as either b is finite or 1− F (x) = o(x−1). Hence, we
have EX
(
1[x∗0<X≤y]XGα
(
x∗1(1−F (x∗1))
1−F (x)
))
= ox∗1→b(1). On the other side,
EX
(
1[y<X≤x∗1]XGα
(
x∗1(1− F (x∗1))
1− F (x)
))
≤
∫ b
y
Xf(X)dX
= y(1− F (y)) +
∫ b
y
1− F (X)dX
= oy→b(1)
By contradiction, assume ∀y < b, ∃α ∈ [0, 1] such that x∗1 > y. Then for any ε > 0, we can set
y such that ∃α,Uα(β˜x∗0 ,x∗1 ) ≤ ε, which contradict the optimality of (x∗0, x∗1) (as bidding truthfully
brings a strictly positive utility).
B.4 Figures when the first stage is with random reserve
The distribution of reserve price in stage 1 is U([0, 1]).
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Figure 3: Welfare sharing with random reserve in stage 1: Left – Utility of the strategic bidder
function of α. Middle – Payment of the strategic bidder function of α. The dotted lines corresponds
to phase 1, the dashed ones to phase 2. The blue color is used for the bidder’s utility and the red for
her payment. The black color is used for the baseline of truthful bidding. Right: evolution of x∗0, x
∗
1
with α.
C Proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium (α = 0)
More formally, the game we are considering is the following: all bidders have the same value
distribution FX . The mechanism is a lazy second price auction with reserve price equal to the
monopoly price of bidders’ bid distributions. We denote by β1, ..., βn the bidding strategies used by
each player and by Ui(β1, ..., βn) the utility of bidder i when using βi. We say that strategy β is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium for this game if for all bidding strategies βˆ and for all bidders i, if all
players except bidder i are using β,
Ui(β, ..., βˆ, ..., β) ≤ Ui(β, ..., β, ..., β)
We can reuse the same type of formulas we introduced in the previous subsection to compute the
expected utility of each bidder. We focus on bidder i. We note Gβ the distribution of the maximum
bid of the competitors of bidder i. The distribution of the highest bid of the competition depends now
on the strategy of bidder i. With this notation,
Ui(β, ..., βˆ, ..., β) = E
(
(X − hβˆ(X))Gβ(βˆ(X))1(X ≥ h−1βˆ (0))
)
.
As in the previous setting, we can compute directional derivatives when βˆ = β + tρ. We can find
different sorts of Bayes-Nash equilibria depending on the class of function bidders are optimizing in.
We call them restricted Nash equilibrium since they are equilibrium in a restricted class of bidding
strategies. In practice, bidders may not be able or willing to implement all possible bidding strategies.
They often limit themselves to strategies that are easy to practically implement.
We have obtained results on restricted Nash equilibria when the bidders restrict themselves to the
class of linear shading or affine shading, though we do not present them here as they are a bit
tangential to the main thrust of this paper. We detail the results on a larger and more interesting
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class of functions: the class of thresholded bidding strategies that we introduced in Definition 1. We
assume that bidders can choose any strategies in this large class of functions.
Our first theorem on a Nash equilibrium between bidders is the following:
Theorem 7. We consider the symmetric setting where all the bidders have the same value distributions.
We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1]. Suppose this distribution has
density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f(1) 6= 0 and X has a distribution for which ψX crosses 0
exactly once and is positive beyond that crossing point.
There is a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in the class of thresholded bidding strategies defined
in Definition 1. It is found by solving Equation (19) to determine r∗ and bidding truthfully beyond r∗
Moreover, if all the bidders are playing this strategy corresponding to the unique Nash equilibrium,
the revenue of the seller is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve price. The same is
true of the utility of the buyers.
Sketch of proof:
• State a directional derivative result in this class of strategies by directionally-differentiating
the expression of Ui(β, ..., βt, ..., β).
• Prove uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium.
• Prove existence of the Nash equilibrium.
• Show equivalence of revenue with a second price auction without reserve.
C.1 A directional derivative result
We can state a directional derivative result in this class of strategies by directionally-differentiating
the expression of Ui(β, ..., βt, ..., β).It implies the only strategy with 0 “gradient" in this class is
truthful beyond a value r (r is different from the one in strategic case), where r can be determined
through a non-linear equation.
Lemma 11. Consider the symmetric setting. Suppose that all the bidders are strategic and that they
are all except one using the strategy β, Gβ denotes the CDF of the maximum bid of the competition
when they use β and gβ the corresponding pdf, consider r and γ such that β = βγr . Assuming that
the seller is welfare-benevolent and that βti = β
γ+tρ
r . Then
∂U(β, ..., βti , ..., β)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= E
(
(X − γ(X))gβ(γ(X))ρ(X)1[X≥r]
)
+ ρ(r)
(1− F (r))
(
E
(
X
1− F (X)gβ
(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
−Gβ(γ(r))
)
Also,
∂U(β, ..., βi, ..., β)
∂r
= −hβ(r)f(r)
(
E
(
X
1− F (X)gβ
(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
−Gβ(γ(r))
)
The only strategy γ and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions ρ consists
in bidding truthfully beyond r∗all, where r
∗
all satisfies the equation
K − 1
r∗all(1− F (r∗all))
E
(
XFK−2(X)(1− F (X))1[X≤r∗all]
)
= FK−1(r∗all) . (19)
Proof. In the case of K symmetric bidders with the same value distributions F , we have
Gβ(x) = F
K−1(β−1(x)) and gβ(β(x)) =
(K − 1)FK−2(x)
β′(x)
f(x) .
The last result follows by plugging-in these expressions in the corresponding equations.
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C.2 Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium
We show that this strategy represents the unique symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the class of
shading functions defined in Definition 1. At this equilibrium, the bidders recover the utility they
would get in a second price auction without reserve price.
Lemma 12. Suppose X has a distribution for which ψX crosses 0 exactly once and is positive
beyond that crossing point. Then Equation (19) has a unique non-zero solution.
Proof. We have by integration by parts
(K − 1)E
((
XFK−2(X)(1− F (X))1[X≤r]
))
= r(1− F (r))FK−1(r) + E
((
ψX(X)F
K−1(X)1[X≤r]
))
.
Hence finding the root of
K − 1
r(1− F (r))E
((
XFK−2(X)(1− F (X))1[X≤r]
))
= FK−1(r)
amounts to finding the root(s) of
R(r) , E
((
ψX(X)F
K−1(X)1[X≤r]
))
= 0 .
0 is an obvious root of the above equation but does not work for the penultimate one. Note that for
the class of distributions we consider (which is much larger than regular distributions but contains it),
this function R is decreasing and then increasing after ψ−1X (0), since the virtual value is negative and
then positive. SinceR(0) = 0, it will have at most one non-zero root for the distributions we consider.
The fact that this function is positive at infinity (or at the end of the support of X) comes from the
fact that its value then is the revenue-per-buyer of a seller performing a second price auction with K
symmetric buyers bidding truthfully with a reserve price of 0. And this is by definition positive. So
we have shown that for regular distributions and the much broader class of distributions we consider
the function R has exactly one non-zero root.
C.3 Existence of the Nash equilibrium
C.3.1 Best response strategy: one strategic case
Definition 1 (Thresholded bidding strategies). A bidding strategy β is called a thresholded bidding
strategy if and only if there exists r > 0 such that for all x < r, hβ(x) = ψB(β(x)) = 0. This family
of functions can be parametrized with
βγr (x) =
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (x) 1[x<r] + γ(x)1[x≥r] ,
with r ∈ R and γ : R→ R strictly increasing.
Lemma 13. Suppose that only one bidder is strategic, let G denote the CDF of the maximum
value of the competition and g the corresponding pdf. Denote by U(βγr ) the utility of the bidder
using the strategy βγr according to the parametrization of Definition 1. Assume that the seller is
welfare-benevolent. Then if βt = βγ+tρr ,
∂U(βt)
∂t
∣∣∣∣
t=0
= E
(
(X − γ(X))g(γ(X))ρ(X)1[X≥r]
)
+ ρ(r)
(1− F (r))
(
E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
−G(γ(r))
)
∂U(βγr )
∂r
=− hβ(r)f(r)(
E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
−G(γ(r))
)
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The only strategy γ and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions ρ consists
in bidding truthfully beyond r∗, where r∗ satisfies the equation
G(r∗) = E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r∗(1− F (r∗))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r∗]
)
. (20)
Proof. Recall that our revenue in such a strategy (we take  = 0) is just, when the seller is welfare-
benevolent (and hence s/he will push the reserve value to 0 as long as ψB(β(x)) ≥ 0 for all x)
U(βγr ) = E
(
(X − ψB(β(X)))G(β(X))1[X≥r]
)
+ E
(
XG(
β(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (x) )1[X≤r]
)
.
Now if βt = β+tρ, as usual, we have ψBt(βt) = hβ+thρ. Because we assumed that ψB(β(r)) > 0,
changing β to βt won’t drastically change that; in particular if ψBt(βt(r)) > 0 the seller is still going
to take all bids after βt(r). In particular, we don’t have to deal with the fact that the optimal reserve
value for the seller may be completely different for β and βt. So the assumption ψB(β(r)) > 0 is
here for convenience and to avoid technical nuisances. In any case, we have
∂U(βt)
∂t
= E
(
[−hρ(X)G(β(X)) + (X − hβ(X))ρ(X)g(γ(X))] 1[X≥r]
)
+E
(
Xρ(r)
1− F (r)
1− F (X)g(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (x) )1[X≤r]
)
.
Now using integration by parts on
∫∞
r
ρ′(x)(1− F (x))G(γ(x))dx, we have
E
(−hρ(X)G(β(X))1[X≥r]) = ρ(x)(1− F (x))G(γ(x))|∞r
+
∫ ∞
r
[ρ(x)f(x)G(γ(x))− ρ(x)β′(x)g(γ(x))(1− F (x))]dx
−
∫ ∞
r
ρ(x)f(x)G(γ(x))dx
= −ρ(r)(1− F (r))G(β(r))− E
(
ρ(X)β′(X)g(γ(X))
1− F (X)
f(X)
)
.
Hence,
∂U(βt)
∂t
= E
(
(X − γ(X))ρ(X)g(γ(X))1[X≥r]
)− ρ(r)(1− F (r))G(γ(r))
+ρ(r)(1− F (r))E
((
X
1− F (X)
)
g(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (x) )1[X≤r]
)
.
This gives the first equation of Lemma 13.
On the other hand, we have
∂U(βγr )
∂r
= −(r − ψB(γ(r)))G(γ(r))f(r) + rG(γ(r))f(r)
+E
(
X
1− F (X)g(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (x) )1[X≤r]
)
[γ′(r)(1− F (r))− β(r)f(r)] .
Since
[γ′(r)(1− F (r))− γ(r)f(r)] = −f(r)ψB(β(r)) ,
we have established that
∂U(βγr )
∂r
= ψB(γ(r))f(r)
[
G(γ(r))− E
(
X
1− F (X)g(
γ(r)(1− F (r))
1− F (x) )1[X≤r]
)]
.
We see that the only strategy β and threshold r for which we can cancel the derivatives in all directions
ρ consists in bidding truthfully beyond r, where r satisfies the equation
G(r) = E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
.
Lemma 13 is shown.
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C.3.2 Proof of existence of the Nash equilibrium
• On Equation (20) and consequences
Recall the statement of Equation (20).
E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
= G(r) . (20)
Lemma 14. Suppose X has a regular distribution that is compactly supported (on [0,1] for conve-
nience). Equation (20) can be re-written as
E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
= G(r)+
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
.
(21)
Equation (20) has at most one solution on (0,1). This possible root is greater than ψ−1(0). 0 is also
a (trivial) solution of Equation (20).
The assumption that X is supported on [0,1] can easily be replaced by the assumption that it is
compactly supported, but it made notations more convenient.
Proof of Lemma 14. We use again integration by parts :
E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
=
∫ r
0
x(1− F (x))
(1− F (x))2 g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
f(x)dx
= x(1− F (x))
G
(
r(1−F (r))
1−F (x)
)
r(1− F (r))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
r
0
− 1
r(1− F (r))
∫ r
0
(x(1− F (x)))′G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
dx
= G(r) +
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
.
So we are really looking at the properties of the solution of
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
= 0 .
We call
I(r) = E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
.
For regular distributions, it is clear that if r = ψ−1(0), I(r) < 0.
Now we note that
∂I(r)
∂r
= ψX(r)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (r)
)
− ψX(r)E
(
ψX(X)
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
.
Using ψX(x) = x− (1− F (x))/f(x) < x, we see that
E
(
ψX(X)
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
< E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
So if r is a solution of
E
(
X
1− F (X)g
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
= G(r)
we have, if r > ψ−1X (0) and r 6= 1,
∂I(r)
∂r
> 0 .
So r needs to be a solution of I(r) = 0 (which is equivalent to the initial equation for non-trivial
solutions) and must have ∂I(r)∂r > 0.
22
So we have shown that I is a function such that its (non-trivial) zeros are such that I is strictly
increasing at those roots. Because I is differentiable and hence continuous, this implies that I can
have at most one non-trivial root. (0 is a trivial root of I(r) = 0, though it is not an acceptable
solution of our initial problem.)
We note that the end point of the support of X is also a trivial solution of I(r) = 0, by the dominated
convergence theorem, though not an acceptable solution of our initial problem, as shown by a simple
inspection.
Lemma 15. Suppose that G(0) = 0, G is continuous and either G(x) = gk(0)xk + o(xk) near 0
for some k or G is constant near 0. Assume f has a continuous density near 1 with f(1) 6= 0 and the
Assumptions of Lemma 14 are satisfied. Then Equation
G(r) =
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
1[X≤r]
)
= 0
has a unique root in (0, 1).
In particular in this situation there exists an optimal strategy in the class of shading functions defined
in Definition 1 and it is unique. It is defined by being truthful beyond r∗ : G(r∗) = 0 and shading in
such a way that our virtual value is 0 below r∗.
Proof. We have already seen that this equation has at most one zero on (0,1) so we now just need to
show that the function G is positive somewhere to have established that it has a zero. Of course, for
r = ψ−1(0), the function is negative.
•G not locally constant near 0 Since G is a cdf, and hence a non-decreasing function, the first k
such that g(k)(0) 6= 0 has g(k)(0) > 0. Otherwise, G would be decreasing around 0. We treat the
case where G is constant near 0 later so we now assume that k exists and is finite.
Let r be such that 1 − F (r) =  very small (e.g. 10−6). Let c < r be such that (1 − F (r))/(1 −
F (c)) < η very small (e.g. 10−3) and ψX(c) > 0. Hence we can use a Taylor approximation to get
that
G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
1[x≤c] ' g(k)(0)(r(1− F (r)))
k
(1− F (x))k 1[x≤c] .
Integrating this out (ignoring at this point possible integration questions), we get
E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
1[X≤c]
)
' g(k)(0)(r(1− F (r)))kE
(
ψX(X)
[1− F (X)]k 1[X≤c]
)
.
Now integration by parts shows that, if k > 1
E
(
ψX(X)
[1− F (X)]k 1[X≤c]
)
=
∫ c
0
x
f(x)
(1− F (x))k −
1
(1− F (x))k−1 dx
=
xf(x)
(1− F (x))k
∣∣∣∣c
0
−
(
1 +
1
k − 1
)∫ c
0
dx
[1− F (x)]k−1 .
If k = 1, using the fact that (ln(1− F (x))′ = −f(x)/(1− F (x)), we have
E
(
ψX(X)
1− F (X)1[X≤c]
)
=
∫ c
0
x
f(x)
1− F (x) − 1dx
= −x ln(1− F (x))|c0 − c+
∫ c
0
ln(1− F (x))dx = −c ln(1− F (c))− c+
∫ c
0
ln(1− F (x))dx
We now assume that k > 1; the adjustments for k = 1 are trivial and are left to the reader. Clearly,
when F (c) is close to 1, we have, since we assume that f(c) 6= 0,∫ c
0
dx
[1− F (x)]k−1 ≤
c
(1− F (c))k−1 = o
(
cf(c)/(1− F (x))k) .
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So we have, as c increases so that F (c) ' 1 (while of course having (1− F (r))/(1− F (c)) < η),
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
1[X≤c]
)
∼ [r(1−F (r))]k−1 g(k)(0) cf(c)
(1− F (c))k > 0 .
So we have, if ψX(x)f(x) is continuous near r, i.e. f(x) is continuous near r,
E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[c≤X≤r]
)
≥ G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (c)
)
E
(
ψX(X)1[c≤X≤r]
)
' G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (c)
)
(r − c)(rf(r)− (1− F (r)) ' G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (c)
)
(r − c)rf(r) .
Now we note that using a Taylor expansion of 1− F (x) around r, we have
x ' r + F (x)− F (r)
f(r)
.
So we see that
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[c≤X≤r]
)
' rG
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (c)
)
F (r)− F (c)
1− F (r) ' rG
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (c)
)(
1− F (c)
1− F (r) − 1
)
.
If now we take c2 such that 1− F (r)/(1− F (c2)) = 1/3, the reasoning above applies and we have
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[c2≤X≤r]
)
≥ rG (r/3) > 0 .
Because pi(r) = (1−F (r))/(1−F (x)) is increasing, we have c ≤ c2, since η = pi(c) ≤ pi(c2) = 1/3
. So we have
1
r(1− F (r))E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[c≤X≤c2]
)
≥ 0 .
Of course the choice of 1/3 above is arbitrary and it could be replaced by any fixed number s < 1
such that G(sr) > 0. We conclude that G is positive in a neighborhood of 1.
•G locally constant near 0 In this case we can pick c such that
E
(
ψX(X)G
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (x)
)
1[X≤c]
)
= 0 .
If c is such that ψ(c) > 0 our arguments above immediately carry through. In fact we can ensure
that this is always true by picking such a c and picking a corresponding r as function of the ratio
(1− F (r))/(1− F (c)) we would like.
So we conclude that even in this case, G is positive in a neighborhood of 1
Theorem 8. We consider the symmetric case and assume that bidders have a compactly supported
and regular distribution. We assume for simplicity that the distribution is supported on [0,1].
Suppose this distribution has density that is continuous at 0 and 1 with f(1) 6= 0.
Then there is a unique symmetric equilibrium in the class of shading functions defined in Definition 1.
It is found by solving Equation (19) to determine r∗ and bidding truthfully beyond r∗.
Proof. We already know that there is at most one solution since Equation (19) has exactly one
solution.
If all the bidders but one put themselves at this strategy, we know from Lemma 15, which applies
because of our assumptions on f , that the optimal strategy for bidder one is unique in the class we
consider and consists in using a shading that is truthful beyond r. This r is uniquely determined
by Equation (20) but given the shading used by the other players we know that the r determined by
Equation (19) is a solution. Hence we have an equilibrium.
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Uniform[0,1] example When K = 2, the solution of Equation (19) and hence the equilibrium is
obtained at r = 3/4. For K = 3, r = 2/3; K = 4 gives r = 15/24 = 0.625; K = 5 gives r = .6.
With appropriate shading functions, the bidders can recover the utility they would get when the seller
was not optimizing her mechanism to maximize her revenue. Nevertheless, this equilibrium can
be weakly collusive since we restrict ourselves to the class of functions introduced in Definition
1. It is not obvious that the strategy exhibited in Theorem 9 is an equilibrium in a larger class of
functions. However, as mentioned previously, from a practical standpoint, as of now there exists no
other clear way to increase drastically bidders utility that is independent from a precise estimation
of the competition. The fact that at symmetric equilibrium bidders recover the same utility as in
a second price auction with no reserves arguably makes it an even more natural class of bidding
strategies to consider from the bidder standpoint.
C.4 Equivalence of revenue
Theorem 9. Suppose we are in a symmetric situation and all buyers use the symmetric optimal
strategy described above.
Then the revenue of the seller is the same as in a second price auction with no reserve price. The
same is true of the revenue of the buyers.
Interestingly, the theorem shows that this shading strategy completely cancels the effect of the reserve
price. This is a result akin to our result on the Myerson auction.
Proof. The revenue of the seller per buyer is
E
(
ψX(X)F
K−1(X)1[X≥r∗]
)
, with R(r∗) = 0 .
Hence it is also
E
(
ψX(X)F
K−1(X)1[X≥r∗]
)
+R(r∗) = E
(
ψX(X)F
K−1(X)
)
.
This is exactly the revenue of the seller in a second price auction with no reserve price.
From the buyer standoint, his/her revenue is, since all buyers are using the same increasing strategy
and the reserve value has been sent to 0,
E
(
(X − ψB(β(X; r∗)))FK−1(X)
)
= E
(
XFK−1(X)1[X≤r∗]
)
+E
(
(X − ψX(X))FK−1(X)1[X>r∗]
)
.
We know however that R(r∗) = 0 and therefore
E
(
XFK−1(X)1[X≤r∗]
)
= E
(
(X − ψX(X))FK−1(X)1[X≤r∗]
)
.
Summing things up we get that his/her payoff
E
(
(X − ψX(X))FK−1(X)
)
as in a second price auction with no reserve.
D Proofs for Subsections 3.2 and 3.3
Proof of Theorem 3 We recall the statement of the theorem.
Theorem 10. We call Gα = αG1 + (1 − α)G2. If the buyer uses the thresholding strategy β˜x1
of Definition 1 and commits to it, we have for their utility, if the seller is welfare benevolent : if
x1 ≥ ψ−1(0),
U(x1) = E
(
XGα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤x1]
)
+ E
(
(X − ψ(X))Gα(X)1[X≥x1]
)
. (22)
if x1 < ψ−1(0),
U(x1) = αE
(
XG1
(
x1(1− F (x1))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤x1]
)
+E
(
(X − ψ(X)) [αG1(X)1[X≥x1] + (1− α)G2(X)1[X≥ψ−1(0)]]) .
(23)
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This utility has (in general) a discontinuity at x1 = ψ−1(0). For x1 < ψ−1(0), we have U(0) ≥
U(x1). For x1 > ψ−1(0), the first order condition are the same as in [17, 16], i.e.
Gα(r) = E
(
X
1− F (X)gα
(
r(1− F (r))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤r]
)
.
where the distribution of the competition is now Gα = αG1 + (1− α)G2 and gα is its density. Call
x∗1(α) the unique solution of this problem.
Hence, the optimal threshold is argmaxx1∈{0,x∗1(α)} U(x1). An optimal threshold at x1 = 0 corre-
sponds to bidding truthfully.
Proof of Theorem 3. We first note that for the thresholding strategy at level x1 we have
ψB(β(x)) = x1[x≥x1] and β(x) =
x1(1− F (x1))
1− F (x) 1[x≤x1] + x1[x>x1] .
Two situations are possible: if the bidder thresholds at x1 > ψ−1(0), then the welfare benevolent
seller has an incentive to take all the bids in the second phase as their revenue curve is non-increasing
in the value (because ψB(β(x)) ≥ 0 for all x). Hence the reserve price in the second phase is
x1(1− F (x1)) and we have for the utility of the bidder in this case
U(x1) = E
(
XGα
(
x1(1− F (x1))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤x1]
)
+ E
(
(X − ψ(X))Gα(X)1[X≥x1]
)
,
as announced in the text.
On the other hand if x1 < ψ−1(0), the revenue of the seller is constant on [0, x1], increasing on
[x1, ψ
−1(0)] and decreasing beyond ψ−1(0). Hence the optimal reserve price is ψ−1(0) regardless
of x1 < ψ−1(0s). In this case we get
U(x1) = αE
(
XG1
(
x1(1− F (x1))
1− F (X)
)
1[X≤x1]
)
+E
(
(X − ψ(X)) [αG1(X)1[X≥x1] + (1− α)G2(X)1[X≥ψ−1(0)]]) .
The function U(x1) is clearly discontinuous at ψ−1(0).
The fact that the optimal x1 in [0, ψ−1(0)) is 0 comes from the fact that the buyer derives no benefit
from overbidding below x1 in terms of reserve price in the second stage, so the auctions are effectively
not optimized on past bids. Hence bidding truthfully is preferable in both stages. This corresponds
to picking x1 = 0. The claim about first order conditions follows from Appendix C. Existence and
uniqueness of x∗1(α) follows from Lemma 14.
Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. When G1 = G2 = G, we have Gα = G. Hence U(r) does not depend on α,
when r > ψ−1(0). Hence the optimal utility for the seller is independent of α; let us call it U∗(G).
On the other hand, we have
U(0) = αE ((X − ψ(X))G(X)) + (1− α)E ((X − ψ(X))G(X)1[X≥ψ−1(0)]) .
Obviously, E ((X − ψ(X))G(X)) > E ((X − ψ(X))G(X)1[X≥ψ−1(0)]). Hence U(0) is increas-
ing in α. In the rest of the proof we denote U(0) by U(0;α) to stress its dependence on α.
The results for α = 0 correspond to [17]. So we know that as α → 0 U(0;α) < U∗(G). Indeed,
thresholding at the monopoly price r = ψ−1(0) beats bidding truthful in that case. And optimal
thresholding beats thresholding at the monopoly price. On the other hand, U(0;α = 1) > U∗(G)
since truthful bidding is optimal when there is no exploitation phase. Since U(0;α) is an increasing
function of α, and is obviously continuous, we see that there exists a unique αc such that if α < αc,
it is preferable for the buyer to shade her bid and above it, it is preferable to bid truthful.
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Figure 4: Utility of the strategic buyer in 2 stage game for various threshold levels r’s, zero
reserves. We consider a setup where we have two bidders, both have Unif[0,1] value distribution.
One is strategic. There is no reserve price in the first stage. Different α’s are displayed. At α ' .762,
the truthful strategy is essentially equivalent to optimal thresholding. For smaller α’s, the optimal
thresholding is preferable (right). For higher α, truthful bidding is preferred. This illustrates the
results of Theorem 3
Proof of Theorem 4
Proof of Theorem 4. It is clear that each buyer’s best response is either to bid truthful or to threshold
optimally in the class of strategies we consider.
The theorem follows from Lemma 2. 1) Part 1. For the first part, we suppose that all players except
1 plays the optimal thresholded strategy characterized by r∗ the unique solution of the equation
K − 1
r(1− F (r))E
(
XFK−2(X)(1− F (X))1[X≤r]
)
= FK−1(r) .
This gives rise to the competition distribution
Gβ(x; r
∗) = FK−1(β−1(x)) =
(
1− r
∗(1− F (r∗))
x
)K−1
1[r∗(1−F (r∗))≤x≤r∗]+FK−1(x)1[x≥r∗] .
According to Lemma 2, for this distribution Gβ(x; r∗), there exists αc,thresh such that if α < αc,thresh,
the best response of the buyer in the class we consider is to threshold at r > ψ−1(0). Our results on
Nash equilibria in the case α = 0 apply. By construction the optimal r for this buyer is r∗ and we
have the Nash equilibrium.
Of course, if α > αc,thresh, the best response of the buyer is to bid truthfully and hence there cannot
be a Nash equilibrium in thresholding above ψ−1(0).
2) Part 2. If all the players except one bid truthfully, Lemma 2 applies with G = FK−1 and says that
there exists αc,truthful, such that if α > αc,truthful the best response of the last player is to bid truthful.
Hence there is a Nash equilibrium in the class we consider. On the other hand, if α < αc,truthful, the
best response of the last player is to threshold above ψ−1(0) and hence there is no Nash equilibrium.
D.1 Illustration of Theorem 3
Figure 4 on p. 27 provides an illustration of Theorem 3: for three different α’s we plot the utility of
the seller.
E Proof of results in Section 4.1
E.1 Proof of Lemma 16 and Corollary 1
Lemma 16. Suppose that the buyer uses a strategy β under her value distribution F . Suppose the
seller thinks that the value distribution of the buyer is G. Call λF and λG the hazard rate functions
of the two distributions Then the seller computes the virtual value function of the buyer under G,
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denoted ψB,G, as
ψB,G(β(x)) = ψB,F (β(x))− β′(x)
(
1
λG(x)
− 1
λF (x)
)
.
Corollary 1. If the buyer uses the strategy β˜()r (x) defined as
β˜()r (x) =
(
(r − )(1− F (r))
1− F (x) + 
)
1[x≤r] + x1[x>r] ,
we have, for x 6= r, ψB,F (β˜()r (x)) = 1[x≤r] + ψF (x)1[x>r] . In particular, we have for x 6= r∣∣∣ψB,F (β˜()r (x))− ψB,G(β˜()r (x))∣∣∣ ≤ |ψF (x)− ψG(x)| [(r − )1[x≤r] + 1[x>r]] .
If for all x, ψB,F (β˜
()
r ) ≥  and |ψF (x)− ψG(x)| ≤ δ, we have ψB,G(β˜()r (x)) ≥ − δmax((r −
), 1) .
Proof. As we have seen before we have
ψB,F (β(x)) = β(x)− β′(x)1− F (x)
f(x)
.
By construction, we have
β(x)− β′(x)1− F (x)
f(x)
= 0 for x ≤ r .
If the seller perceives the behavior of the buyer under the distribution G, we have
ψB,G(β(x)) = β(x)− β′(x)1−G(x)
g(x)
.
Hence, we have
|ψB,G(β(x))− ψB,F (β(x))| = |β′(x)|
∣∣∣∣1− F (x)f(x) − 1−G(x)g(x)
∣∣∣∣ .
Recall the hazard function λF (x) = f(x)/(1− F (x)). With this notation, we simply have
|ψB,G(β(x))− ψB,F (β(x))| = |β′(x)|
∣∣∣∣ 1λF (x) − 1λG(x)
∣∣∣∣ .
The corollary follows by noting that when x ≤ r,∣∣∣∣β′r,(x)1− F (x)f(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (r − ) 1− F (r)1− F (x)
Hence, a natural way to quantify the proximity of distributions in this context is of course in terms of
their virtual value functions. Furthermore, if the buyer uses a shading function such that, under her
strategy and with her value distribution, the perceived virtual value is positive, as long as the seller
computes the virtual value using a nearby distribution, she will also perceive a positive virtual value
and hence have no incentive to put a reserve price above the lowest bid. In particular, if δ comes from
an approximation error that the buyer can predict or measure, she can also adjust her  so as to make
sure that the seller perceives a positive virtual value for all x.
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E.2 Proof of Theorem 5
Theorem 5. Suppose the buyer has a continuous and increasing value distribution F , supported
on [0, b], b ≤ ∞, with the property that if r ≥ y ≥ x, F (y) − F (x) ≥ γF (y − x), where γF > 0.
Suppose finally that supt≥r t(1− F (t)) = r(1− F (r)).
Suppose the buyer uses the strategy β˜()r described above and samples n values {xi}ni=1 i.i.d according
to the distribution F and bids accordingly in second price auctions. Call x(n) = max1≤i≤n xi. In
this case the (population) reserve value x∗ is equal to 0.
Assume that the seller uses empirical risk minimization to determine the monopoly price in a (lazy)
second price auction, using these n samples.
Call xˆ∗n the reserve value determined by the seller using ERM.
We have, if Cn(δ) = n−1/2
√
log(2/δ)/2 and  > x(n)Cn(δ)/F (r) with probability at least 1− δ1,
xˆ∗n <
2rCn(δ)
γF
with probability at least 1− (δ + δ1) .
In particular, if  is replaced by a sequence n such that
n1/2nmin(1, 1/x(n))→∞ in probability, xˆ∗n goes to 0 in probability like n−1/2max(1, x(n))/n.
Examples : Our theorem applies for value distributions that are bounded, with n of order n−1/2+η ,
η > 0 and fixed. If the value distribution is log-normal(µ, σ) truncated away from 0 so all values
are greater than a very small threshold t, standard results on the maximum of i.i.d N (µ, σ) random
variables guarantee that x(n) ≤ exp(µ+ σ
√
2 log(n)) with probability going to 1. In that case too,
picking n of order n−1/2+η, η > 0 and fixed, guarantees that the reserve value computed by the
seller by ERM will converge to the population reserve value, which is of course 0.
Comment : The requirement on γF , which essentially means that the density f is bounded away
from 0 could also be weakened with more technical work to make this requirement hold only around
0, at least for the convergence in probability result. Similarly one could handle situations, like the
log-normal case, where γF is close to 0 at 0 by refining slightly the first part of the argument given in
the proof. The formal proof is in Appendix E.
Proof. • Preliminaries
Notations : We use the standard notation for order statistics b(1) ≤ b(2) ≤ . . . ≤ b(n) to denote our n
increasingly ordered bids. We denote as usual by Fˆn the empirical cumulative distribution function
obtained from a sample of n i.i.d observations drawn from a population distribution F .
Setting the monopoly price by ERM amounts to finding, if Bˆn is the empirical cdf of the bids,
b∗n = argmax
t
t(1− Bˆn(t))
We note in particular than
b∗n ≤ max
1≤i≤n
bi = b(n) ,
since (1− Bˆn(t)) = 0 for t > b(n).
Because (1− Bˆn(t)) is piecewise constant and the function t 7→ t is increasing, on [b(i), b(i+1)) the
function t(1− Bˆn(t)) reaches its supremum at b−(i+1).
b∗n = argmax
t
t(1− Bˆn(t)) = argmax
1≤i≤n−1
b−(i+1)
(
1− i
n
)
.
Since our shading function βr, is increasing and if x(i) are our ordered values, we have, if Fˆn is the
empirical cdf of our value distribution,
argmax
1≤i≤n−1
b−(i+1)
(
1− i
n
)
= argmax
1≤i≤n−1
βr,(u
−
(i+1))
(
1− i
n
)
= argmax
u
βr,(u)(1− Fˆn(u)) .
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The last equality comes again from the fact that (1 − Fˆn(u)) is piecewise constant and βr,(u) is
increasing. So in our analysis we can act as if the seller had perfect information of our shading
function βr,.
In what follows we focus on reserve values and denote
xˆ∗r,n = argmax
0≤x≤r
βr,(x)(1− Fˆn(x)) , xˆ∗n = argmax
0≤x
βr,(x)(1− Fˆn(x)) ,
x∗ = argmaxβr,(x)(1− F (x))
The arguments we gave above imply that xˆ∗r,n ≤ x(n). We will otherwise study the continuous
version of the problem. We also note that by construction, x∗ = 0, though we keep it in the proof as
it makes it clearer.
We recall one main result of [25] on the Dvoretzky-Kiefer-Wolfowitz (DKW) inequality: if Cn(δ) =
n−1/2
√
log(2/δ)/2,
P (sup
x
|Fˆn(x)− F (x)| > Cn(δ)) ≤ δ .
In what follows, we therefore assume that we have a uniform approximation
∀x , |Fˆn(x)− F (x)| ≤ Cn(δ) ,
since it holds with probability 1− δ. In what follows we write Cn instead of Cn(δ) for the sake of
clarity. Using the fact that βr, is increasing, this immediately implies that with probability at least
1− δ, for any c > 0
∀x ∈ [0, c] , |βr,(x)(1− Fˆn(x))− βr,(x)(1− F (x))| ≤ βr,(c)Cn .
• xˆ∗r,n = argmaxy≤r βr,(y)(1− Fˆn(y)) cannot be too far from x∗
Now for our construction of βr,(x), we have by construction that
∂
∂u
[β(u)(1− F (u))] = −f(u) when x ≤ r .
In particular, it means that when x, y ≤ r
βr,(x)(1− F (x))− βr,(y)(1− F (y)) = −(F (x)− F (y)) .
Also x∗ = 0 since βr,(1 − F ) is decreasing on [0, r], as we have just seen that its derivative is
negative. Here we used the fact that F is increasing.
If r > y ≥ x∗ + tCn/, we have, using the previous inequality and the fact that βr,(1 − F ) is
decreasing on [0, r],
βr,(y)(1− F (y)) ≤ βr,(x∗)(1− F (x∗))− (F (x∗ + tCn/)− F (x∗)) .
Since we assumed that F (y)− F (x) ≥ γF (y − x), we have
−(F (x∗ + tCn/)− F (x∗)) ≤ −tCnγF .
Since βr, is increasing, we have sup0≤x≤r βr,(x) ≤ βr,(r) = r. Picking t > 2r/γF , it is clear
that for r > y ≥ x+ tCn/,
max
r≥u≥x+tCn/
βr,(u)(1− Fˆn(u)) ≤ max
r≥u≥x+tCn/
βr,(u)(1− F (u)) + max
r≥u≥x+tCn/
βr,(u)Cn
≤ βr,(x∗)(1− F (x∗)) + (r − tγF )Cn < βr,(x∗)(1− F (x∗))− rCn ≤ βr,(x∗)(1− Fˆn(x∗)) .
We conclude that xˆ∗r,n cannot be greater than x+ 2rCn/(γF ) and therefore
xˆ∗r,n − xˆ <
2rCn
γF
.
• Dealing with maxy>r βr,(y)(1− Fˆn(y))
Recall that maxx βr,(x)(1−F (x)) = βr,(0)(1−F (0)) = r(1−F (r)) + F (r). We now assume
that maxy≥r y(1 − F (y)) = r(1 − F (r)). This is in particular the case for regular distributions,
which are commonly assumed in auction theory.
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To show that the argmax cannot be in [r, b] with pre-specified probability we simply show that the
estimated value of the seller revenue at reserve value 0 is higher than maxy>r βr,(y)(1− Fˆn(y)).
Of course,
max
y>r
βr,(y)(1− Fˆn(y)) = max
x(n)≥y>r
βr,(y)(1− Fˆn(y)) .
Recall that βr,(0) = r(1− F (r)) + F (r). Under our assumptions, we have
βr,(0)(1− Fˆn(0)) = βr,(0) = r(1− F (r)) + F (r) and
max
x(n)≥y≥r
βr,(y)(1− Fˆn(y))
≤ max
x(n)≥y≥r
βr,(y)(1− F (y)) + Cn max
x(n)≥y≥r
βr,(y) ≤ r(1− F (r)) + Cnx(n)
So as long as  > x(n)Cn/F (r), the result we seek holds. By assumption this property holds with
probability 1− δ1.
The statement of the theorem holds when both parts of the proof hold. Since they hold with
probability at least 1− δ and 1− δ1 the intersection event holds with probability at least 1− δ − δ1,
as announced.
• Asymptotic statement/Convergence in probability issue
This is a straightforward application of the previous result and we give no further details.
F Proof of results of Section 4.2
This theorem works for non-regular value distributions and in the asymmetric case when the bidders
have different value distributions.
Theorem 6 (Thresholding at the monopoly price). Consider the one-strategic setting in a lazy second
price auction with FXi the value distribution of the strategic bidder i with a seller computing the
reserve prices to maximize her revenue. Suppose βr is an increasing strategy with associated reserve
value r > 0. Suppose α = 0, i.e. there is only an exploitation phase. Then there exists β˜r which
does not depend on G such that : 2) Ui(β˜r) ≥ Ui(βr), Ui being the utility of the strategic bidder. 3)
Ri(β˜r) ≥ Ri(βr), Ri being the payment of bidder i to the seller. The following continuous functions
fulfill these conditions for  ≥ 0 small enough:
β˜()r (x) =
(
[βr(r)− ](1− FXi(r))
1− FXi(x)
+ 
)
1x<r + βr(x)1x≥r
In the two-stage game, there is a critical value αc for which, if α < αc, it is preferable for the bidder
to threshold at the monopoly price and if α > αc, it is preferable for the bidder to bid truthfully.
Proof: Important special case of βr(x) = x; We assumed that the seller computes the reserve
price to maximize her revenue. Hence r = argmaxx(1 − FXi(x)). In this case,∫ r
0
ψi(xi)G(xi)fi(xi)dxi ≤ 0 (otherwise the reserve price would be lower and since the payment of
bidder i is equal to
∫ +∞
r
ψi(xi)G(xi)fi(xi)dxi.
β˜
()
r defined in Theorem 6 verifies the ODE defined in Lemma 6 such that hβ˜()r (x) =
ψB
β˜
()
r
(β˜r
()
(x)) =  for x ∈ [0, r] and hβ˜()(x) = ψXi(x) for x ∈ [r,+∞]. β˜()r is trivially
increasing.
Hence, the virtual value of the distribution induced by β˜()r is non-negative on [0, r] and the new
reserve value is equal to zero. The new reserve price is therefore equal to the minimum bid of bidder
i and
Ri(β˜
()
r ) = Ri(βr) + EXi∼Fi
(
Gi(β˜
()
r (Xi))1(Xi ≤ r)
)
≥ Ri(βr) .
The new bidder’s utility is
Ui(β˜
()
r ) = Ui(βr) + EXi∼Fi
(
(Xi − )Gi(β˜()r (Xi))1(Xi ≤ r)
)
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For  = 0 we have clearly U(β˜()r ) ≥ U(βr) and Ri(β˜()r ) = Ri(βr). Outside pathological cases, it
is a strict inequality and by continuity with respect to , i.e. assuming G continuous, it is true in a
neighborhood of zero so for some  > 0.
We now handle rigorously the general case:
Proof. The reserve value r > 0 is given. Consider
β˜r(x) =
{
tr(x) if x ≤ r
βr(x) if x > r
To make things simple we require tr(r) = βr(r+), so we have continuity. Note that beyond r the
seller revenue is unaffected. If the seller sets the reserve value at r0 the extra benefit compared to
setting it at r is
E
(
ψtr (tr(X)G(tr(X))1[r0≤X<r]
)
.
Hence, as long as ψtr (x) ≥ 0, the seller has an incentive to lower the reserve value. The extra gain to
the buyer is
E
(
(X − ψtr (tr(X)))G(tr(X))1[r0≤X<r]
)
.
Now, if we take
tr(x) =
tr(0)
1− F (x) ,
it is easy to verify that
ψtr (tr(x)) = tr(x)− t′r(x)
1− F (x)
f(x)
= 0 .
So in this limit case, there is no change in buyer’s payment and when the reserve price is moved by
the seller to any value on [0, r]. If we assume that the seller is welfare benevolent, she will set the
reserve value to 0. To have continuity of the bid function, we just require that
tr(0)
1− F (r) = βr(r
+) .
Since there is no extra cost for the buyer, it is clear that his/her payoff is increased with this strategy.
Taking t()r such that
ψ
t
()
r
(t()r (x)) =  ,
gives a strict incentive to the seller to move the reserve value to 0, (so the assumption that s/he
is welfare benevolent is not required) even if it is slightly suboptimal for the buyer. Note that we
explained in Lemma 6 how to construct such a ψ. In particular,
tr =
C
1− F (x) + , with
C
1− F (r) +  = βr(r
+)
works. Taking limits proves the result, i.e. for  small enough the Lemma holds, since everything is
continuous in .
To extend to the two stage process, we can use exactly the same proof as in Lemma 2.
Comment We note that the flexibility afforded by  is two-fold: when  > 0, the extra seller revenue
is a strictly decreasing function of the reserve price; hence even if for some reason reserve price
movements are required to be small, the seller will have an incentive to make such move. The
other reason is more related to estimation issues: if the reserve price is determined by empirical risk
minimization, and hence affected by even small sampling noise, having  big enough will guarantee
that the mean extra gain of the seller will be above this sampling noise. Of course, the average cost
for the bidder can be interpreted to just be  at each value under the current reserve price and hence
may not be a too hefty price to bear.
For the sake of clarity, we first consider the case where the strategic bidder is only optimizing her
utility in the second stage. We consider the robust-optimization framework [26]. We show that
thresholding at the monopoly price is the best-response in the worst case of the competition when the
number of players is not known to the strategic bidder.
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We assume that the bidders know that they all have the same value distribution but they do not know
the number of bidders K. The problem is now to find the optimal thresholding parameter in the worst
case :
r∗ = argmax
r
minK∈NU(βr,K)
We call this strategy the best robust-optimization strategy.
Theorem 11. Consider the one-strategic setting in a lazy second price auction with FXi regular.
Assume the symmetric setting where all the other bidders have the same value distributions and
assume the non-strategic bidders are bidding truthfully. Consider the setting where α = 1. In the
class of thresholded strategies, the best robust-optimization strategy is to threshold at the monopoly
price and bid truthfully after.
Proof. Based on Lemma 13, we know that given a competition distribution G, the best response in
the class of thresholded strategies is to bid truthfully above a certain threshold r.
Given Lemma 6, we know that for any given competition distribution G, the optimal threshold r
verifies r ≥ ψ−1(0).
For any r > ψ−1(0), we show that there exists Klim such that ∀K ≥ Klim, it is better to bid
truthfully on [a, r] with ψ−1(0) < a < r.
U(βtr)−U(βr) =
∫ r
ψ−1(0)
(x−ψ(x))F (x)K−1f(x)dx−
∫ r
ψ−1(0)
x
(
F
(
(1− F (r))r
1− F (x)
))K−1
f(x)dx
Since F is regular and by definition of the monopoly price,
∀x ∈ [ψ−1(0), r], (1− F (r))r
1− F (x) ≤ x
(In the case of equality ψ(x) = 0). By definition of the virtual value, x−ψ(x)x ∈)0, 1(. Hence, if F is
increasing (defined on all its support), for all r > ψ−1(0) there exists a ∈)ψ−1(0), r(and Klim such
that ∀K ≥ Klim, and
∀x ∈ [a, r], x− ψ(x)
x
≥
(
F
(
(1−F (r))r
1−F (x)
))K−1
F (x)K−1
.
Hence thresholding at the monopoly price is optimal in the worst case of the competition distribution.
G Proof of results of Section 4.3
G.1 Thresholding at the monopoly price in the Myerson auction
Here we ask what happens when one player is strategic, the others are truthful and she thresholds her
virtual value at her monopoly price in the Myerson auction.
Lemma 3. Consider the one-strategic setting. Assume all bidders have the same value distribution,
FX and that FX is regular. Assume that bidder i is strategic that the K − 1 other bidders bid
truthfully. Let us denote by βtruth the truthful strategy and βthresh the thresholded strategy at the
monopoly price. The utility of the truthful bidder in the Myerson auction UMyersoni and in the lazy
second price auction ULazyi satisfy
UMyersoni (βthresh)− UMyersoni (βtruth) ≥ ULazyi (βthresh)− ULazyi (βtruth)
Proof. By definition the thresholded strategy at monopoly price βthresh verifies
ψBi(bi) =
{
ψXi(xi) if xi ≥ ψ−1Xi (0)
 = 0+ if xi < ψ−1Xi (0) .
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The revenue/utility of the buyer in the Myerson auction is
UMyersoni (β) = E
(
(Xi − ψBi(Bi))1[ψBi (Bi)≥maxj 6=i(0,ψBj (Bj))]
)
.
If we assume that all players except the i-th are truthful and the i-th player employs the strategy
described above, we get that
UMyersoni (βthresh) = E
(
(Xi − ψBi(Bi))1[ψBi (Bi)≥maxj 6=i(0,ψBj (Bj))]
)
= E
(
(Xi − ψXi(Xi))1[ψXi (Xi)≥maxj 6=i(0,ψXj (Xj))]1
[
Xi≥ψ−1Xi (0)
])
+E
(
(Xi − )1[≥maxj 6=i ψXj (Xj)]1
[
Xi<ψ
−1
Xi
(0)
])
Note that here we’ve just split the integral into two according to whether Xi was greater of less than
the monopoly price and adjusted the definitions of ψBi(bi) accordingly. We conclude immediately
that
UMyersoni (βthresh) = U
Myerson
i (βtruth) + E
(
(Xi − )1[≥maxj 6=i ψXj (Xj)]1
[
Xi<ψ
−1
Xi
(0)
]) .
Therefore the extra utility derived from our shading is just
UMyersoni (βthresh)− UMyersoni (βtruth) = E
(
(Xi − )1[≥maxj 6=i ψXj (Xj)]1
[
Xi<ψ
−1
Xi
(0)
])
If Xj’s are independent of Xi, we have
UMyersoni (βthresh)()− UMyersoni (βtruth)() = E
(
(Xi − )P ( ≥ max
j 6=i
ψXj (Xj))1[Xi<ψ−1Xi (0)]
)
When the Xj’s are independent of each other and we pick  = 0 we get
lim
→0
UMyersoni (βthresh)()− UMyersoni (βtruth)() =
∏
j 6=i
P (Xj ≤ ψ−1j (0))
E(Xi1[Xi<ψ−1Xi (0)]
)
Going back to our work on second price auctions, the gain from thresholding in a continuous manner
at 0 was
ULazyi (βthresh)− ULazyi (βtruth) = E
(
XG(t0(X))1[X≤ψ−1(0)]
)
.
In this case, t0(x) = ψ−1(0)(1− F (ψ−1(0)))/(1− F (x)), G(x) = FK−1(x) using symmetry and
independence. As we’ve seen above,
UMyersoni (βthresh)−UMyersoni (βtruth) = E
(
X1[X≤ψ−1(0)]
)
FK−1(ψ−1(0)) = E
(
X1[X≤ψ−1(0)]
)
G(ψ−1(0)) .
Now since t0(x) ≤ ψ−1(0), we see that in the symmetric case, for the 1-strategic player we have
extra gainMyerson ≥ extra gainsecond price ,
since G(ψ−1(0)) ≥ G(t0(x)) when x ≤ ψ−1(0).
Of course, in the symmetric case, the truthful revenue is the same in the Myerson and 2nd price lazy
auction. As such the relative gain is also higher in the Myerson auction than in the second price
auction.
Example: K symmetric bidders, unif[0,1] distribution, 1 strategic In this case, ψ−1i (0) =
1/2,
∫ 1/2
0
xf(x)dx =
∫ 1/2
0
xdx = 1/8. And
∏
j 6=i P (Xj ≤ ψ−1j (0)) = 2−(K−1). The truthful
revenue/utility is the same as in a 2nd price auction with reserve at 1/2. Elementary computations
show that this utility is
∫ 1
1/2
xK−1 − xKdx = (1− (K + 2)/2K+1)/(K(K + 1)).
Numerics for K = 2 When K = 2, the utility is 1/12 in the truthful case. And the extra utility is
1/16, i.e. 75% of the utility in the truthful case. Hence the utility of the shaded strategy is 7/48. We
note that the gain is even larger than for a 2nd price auction with monopoly reserve where the extra
utility was 57%
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Remarks about the asymmetric case In the asymmetric case, it becomes harder to make a relative
comparison of gains. That is because the truthful revenue in Myerson and 2nd price auctions are
different. Furthemore, for the extra gain, even if Xj’s are independent, we have to compare
E
Xi1[Xi≤ψ−1i (0)]∏
j 6=i
Fj(ψ
−1
j (0))
 and E
Xi1[Xi≤ψ−1i (0)]∏
j 6=i
Fj
(
ψ−1i (0)(1− Fi(ψ−1i (0)))
1− Fi(Xi)
)
In general, the comparison seem like it could go either way. An exception is the case ψ−1j (0) ≥
ψ−1i (0) for all j 6= i: then the extra revenue in the Myerson auction is greater than the extra revenue
in the second price auction.
G.2 Thresholding at the monopoly price in the eager second price auction with monopoly
price
Lemma 4. Consider the one-strategic setting with FXi the value distribution of the strategic bidder i
that we assume regular. The K-1 other bidders have the same value distribution than bidder i and bid
truthfully. Lets not βtruth the truthful strategy and βthresh the thresholded strategy at the monopoly
price. The utility of the truthful bidder in the Myerson auction UMyersoni and in the lazy second price
auction ULazyi verifies
UEageri (βthresh)− UEageri (βtruth) ≥ ULazyi (βthresh)− ULazyi (βtruth)
Proof. The proof is very similar to the previous one. We recall that in the eager version of the second
price auction, the winner of the auction is the bidder with the highest bid among bidders who clear
their reserve price and she pays the maximum between the second highest bid and her reserve price.
To complete the proof, we need to remark that in the symmetric case, the utility of the strategic bidder
in the eager second price auction is
UEageri (β) = E
(
(Xi − ψBi(Bi))Gi(β(Xi))1[Bi≥maxj 6=i(psi−1Bj (0))]
)
.
with Gi the distribution of the highest bid of the competition above their reserve price. As we are in
the symmetric case and all the bidders different than i are bidding truthfully:
∀x ∈ [0, ψ−1X (0)], Gi(x) = FK−1X (ψ−1X (0)) .
Hence,
UEageri (βthresh)− ULazyi (βlazy) = E
(
X
(
FK−1X (ψ
−1
FX
(0))− FK−1X (x)
)
1[X≤ψ−1FX (0)]
)
≥ 0
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